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U.S. Farm Policy: An Australian
Perspective
GeoffEdwards
RESIDENT Reagan has said United States farm
programs are inefficient, costly amid unfair.’ The Aus-
tralian prime minister, Mr. Hawke, agrees with that
assessment, and considers it applicable to the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Japan also.
This paper compares the role and the recent situa-
tion of agriculture in the United States and Australia,
assesses the international impact of U.S. farm policy
and discusses possible approaches to reducing pro-
tection foi agriculture in the United States and else-
where in the worid.
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIAN
FARMING: A BRIEF COMPARISON
The relative importance of farming in the United
States and Austr-alian economies from 1957 to 1987 is
shown in table 1. Far-ming’s contribution to GNP fell
from 4 percent to less than 2 percent in the United
States; the fall in Australia was from over 14 percent to
less than 4 per-cent. While the share of farnung in
employment was 50 percent higher in each country
than the recent farm GNP component, it also fell
substantially, especially in the United States over the
three decades shown.
GeoffEdwards isaseniorlecturerin agricultural economicsat LaTrobe
University, Melbourne, Australia. This paper was presented at the
annualmeeting ofthe FederalReserve SystemCommittee on Agricul-
ture and Rural Development held at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis on May 21, 1987.
‘See Council of Economic Advisers (1987).
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The percentage conti rhution of farm exports to
total merchandise exports rn the two countries cue
shown rn table 2. Ihis contribution was generally
more than twice as high rn Australia as in the United
States. The proportionate fall in agricultures share of
exports over the decade to 1986 was higher in the
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Notwithstanding the increase infarm indebtedness,
the ratio of farm debt to assets remains melatively low
in both countries; however, Australiami farmers have
significantly lower measured debt-asset ratios than
their American counterparts (table 5). Part of this dif-
ference may be due to differences in the liabilities
included. It is notable that, apart from “other crop
growers,’ Australian farmers did not experience sub-
stantial imicreases in their debt ratio as did U.S. farmers
over the period 1978 to 1986. However, the increase in
indebtedness andthe rise to high levels in realinterest
rates caused an increase from 8 percent to 14 percent
in interest payments’ share in cash costs in Australian
broadacre farming between 1978 and 1986.’
Changes in debt ratios reflect, in part, movements in
land values. Falls in agricultural land values of 40
percent to 50 percent were common in the United
‘Kingma (1987).
States in the five years to February 1986. In Australia,
farm land price declines havebeen much smaller and
confined mainly to cropping areas. Average land val-
ues in the important wheat-sheep belt are estimated
by the ABARE to have risen until 1985, and to have
fallen by 20 percent between 1985 and 1987.’ After
taking account ofAustralia’s high inflation rate, thefall
is 33 percent in real values.
There are important differences, arising largely from
dissimilarities in climate and natural soil fertility, in
farming practices in the United States and Australia.
Approximately 70 percent of beef cattle are lot fed in
the United States, while virtually all beef is produced
on pastures in Australia.~Similarly, dairy cows are not
housed in Australia. Wheat grows in the winter in
Australia and in the spring in the United States. Most
Australian soils are deficient in phosphorus, and this
is rectified by application of phosphatic fertilizers.
However, United States farming makes much more
intensive use of nitrogenous fertilizers. In Australia
‘The Bureau of Agricultural Economics became the Australian Bu-
reauof Agricultural and Resource Economics in September, 1987.
4McLeish and Spill (1987).
indebtedness in the United States increased less over
this period than consumer prices.
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grain crops are normally grown in rotation with pas-
tures containing legumes to provide nitrogen for use
by pasture gr-asses and by subsequent cr-ops.
A final imnpor-tant fact is the difference in the abso-
lute size ofagriculture in the United States amid Austra-
ha. Both countries are significant player-s in interna-
tional trade in Australia’s four top farm export
commodities (shown in table 6 in decreasing om-der of
export earnings). For the two countries, the volume of
beef and veal traded is similar, and this is true for
sugar also. The United States exports twice as much
wheat as Australia, while Australia is a much bigger
player in world trade in wool.
On the production side, the United States produces
much more of each commodity apart from wool; 30
percent greater for sugar; nearly four times as large for
wheat; and eight times as large for beef and veal. This
means that, except for wool, there is much greater
potential for changes in production in the United
States — changes arising fr-om developments in do-
mestic farm policy, gains in productivity or other fac-
tors to influence world prices, and hence the benefits
fi-omn trade to other expor-ting and importing coun-
tries. The European Comnmnunity produces more
wheat arid sugar than the United States, but less beef
and veal.
U.S. FARM POLICY AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT
Compared to Australia, the European Commu-
nity and many other countries, agricultur-al policy in
the United States is considerably more complex~and
its effects exceedingly difficult to assess. There are
sever-al reasons for this.
First, the optional nature of farm programs for’
wheat, corn and other grains means that policy aria-
lysts must assess separately the effect of programs on
incentives and on producers’ r-esponses for program
par-ticipants and non—participants. Programs typi-
cally cause price changes for’ non-participants as well
as for’ participants.l’l’he proportions of production
that will he accounted for by each category of pro-
ducers must also be estimated.
Second, substantial changes in U.S. farm programs
occur frequently.
Third, U.S. farm policy relies heavily on a large
number of policy instrirments. Six of these instru-
ments are listed in table 7. The fir-st column in table 7
summarizes the effect of each instr’ument on farm
producer incentives irI the United States. Each instr-u-
ment is considered hi isolation from the others; the
effects shown ar’e r’elative to a situation of no govern-
ment intervention fri agricultural mar’kets.
The first instrument, mandatory unpaid land set-
asides, acts as a tax on farmer-s. The second instr-u-
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ment serves as a production subsidy when the loan
rate is high relative to the wor’ld price, so that the
Commodity Credit Cor-poration accumulates stocks.
When the CCC releases stocks, the effect is equivalent
to a tax omi producers. The other instruments act as
subsidies and, except for two-price schemes having a
particular characteristic — farmers return from their
marginal production being equal to the world price —
encourage extra production.
The two final columnns show the effect of each
United States farm policy instrument on the net eco-
nomic benefits to other’ countries. Most of the instru-
merits shown reduce wor-Id prices making other na-
tions that expor’t these commodities worse off, and
impom’ting countries better off l’his is true of target
prices achieved via deficiency payments, two price
schemes (the resulting reduction in U.S. consumption
causes the world price to falleven if U.S. production is
not increased, tariffs/quantitative import restrictions,
and export subsidies.
The massive value of deficiency payments to United
States farmers is illnnstrated b their’ capitalized values
per acre. In 1985 these were; $450 for wheat, $562 for
corn, $1050 for’ cotton and $1725 for mice? Ifdeficiency
payments were made completely independent of cur-
‘Council of EconomicAdvisers (1986).
One important instmtrment of United States farm
policy invariably works to raise world prices for fan-m
commodities, and another policy sometimnes does.
Mandatory acreage reductions increase world pr-ice in
two ways. First, they reduce production via a move-
ment down the industry supply curve. Second, they
increase costs perunit of output as farmers substitute
fertilizers and other inputs in place of land. Of the
instruments listed in table 7, acreage reductions alone
clearly hemiefit other’ exporting countries such as Aus-
tralia.
When the loan rate fbr crops is set at a level that
draws commodities fr’om the commercial market into
CCC stocks, the wor-Id pr’ice is n-aised. This was the
situation in the period covered by the 1981 Farm Bill.
When stocks are sold, however, other exporting coun-
tries are harmed, while importing countries benefit
from the lower prices.
‘the effects of United States fiu’mpolicies on outpnnt
do not arise only thr-ough higher producer prices.
These policies, especially the loan price and tar’get
price deficiency pavmnent schemnes, provide a much
higher /evelofcertainty about finure prices that would
exist in afree market. For example, the 1985 Farm Bill
provided target prices for wheat to be maintained at
their 1985 level of $4.38 per bushel in 1986 and 1987,
rent production as suggested by sever-al U.S. congress-
men and the Administration, deficiency payments
could support farm incomes without inducing in-
crease in production.
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declining to $4.29 in 1988, $4.16 in 1989 and $4.00 in
1990. Although the bill announced reductions in loan
prices, (effectively minimum prices for producers’ cur-
rent production), it provided valuable reductions in
uncertainty about prices through to 1990. The greater
certainty about prices provided by the target price and
loan price undertakings of the Farm Bill means that
risk-averse farmers find it attractive to produce at
higher levels than they would do with the same ex-
pected prices but without the price guarantees.
While the role of price supports in producing the
problems of global agriculture has rightly been em-
phasized, the contribution to surplus-generating in-
vestment provided by ahigh degree of certainty about
process for several years ahead has been relatively
neglected. While it is difficult empirically to separate
these two effects, it is obvious that pr’oduction would
be reduced substantially ifexisting price support lev-
els were provided in the form of subsidies on prices in
free markets, with the price guarantees being re-
moved.
Of course, the critical issue for Australian wheat or
sugar producers is the overall effect that the entire
package of policies making up the commodity pro-
gram exert on other countries. While assessing this is
complicated, some evidence on the effect of United
States agricultural programs on world prices and
trade can be presented.
TheMailer ofPrices and Access
The extent to which one nation’s agricultural
policies effectthe economic fortunes ofanother coun-
A useful indicator- of price distortions in agriculture
is given by nominal protection coefficients for pro-
ducer prices and consumer prices. These coefficients
express domestic prices as the ratios ofborder prices,
where border prices can he considered as export
prices for export situations and import prices for im-
port situations. Information on nonunal protection
coefficients forproducer and consumer prices for’ the
United States, Australia, the European Economic
Community and Japan for the years 1980-1982 is
shown in table 8.
Rates ofproducer protection were atleast as high in
the United States as in Australia for each of the seven
commodities. The figures in the bottom row indicate
that United States price supports encouraged aggre-
gate agricultural production much more than Austra-
lian pricing policies did. Overall, the price of food to
consumers was also raised more by market interven-
tions in the United States than in Australia, although
buyers of wheat and rice fared better in the United
States. policies that raise domestic consumer prices
also harm other export countries by increasing the
output that must be disposed of on other world mar-
kets.
For perspective it should be noted that producer
and consumer prices were higher relative to world
prices in the European Economic Community than in
the United States, and they were much higher still in
Japan.
try depends mainly on the resulting price distortiomis
in the fomier country and on the non-price restric-
tions placed on the latter country’s trade.
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Rates of producer subsidy would genen-ally have
been higher’ in mom-c recent years than in the years
1980-1982. This is due mainly to the lower level of
world pt’ices — against which subsidy rates ar’e mea-
sured. Anderson and ‘Fyers (1987) projected average
producer to borderprice ratios of 1.5 for United States
agriculture in 1988 and 2.0 for all industrial market
economies.
Australia’s top r’ural export is not included in table
8. Wool gr’owing is very lightly assisted thnough gov-
er’nment intervention in Austr’alia. The United States
tariffof 10 cents apound )clean on wool appears to be
arelatively minor impediment to Australian exports of
wool in this man-ket. In addition to the benefits con-
ferred by the tariff, United States wool growei’s re-
ceived payments from taxpayers amounting to about
20 percent of their cash r’eceipts in 1985.’
Australia’s agricultural trading opportunities are
not restricted only by policy interventions that raise
prices to overseas producers and consumers. It also
faces quantitative restrictions on access ofsome com-
modities to major markets. Restrictions on exports of
beef and sugar to the United States are important
cases.
The Impact ofU.S. Farm Policies on
International Trade
The Bureau of Agricultural Economics has esti-
mated that the Common Agricultural Policy of the
European Economic Community caused income
losses to Austr-alian farmers of almost $A1 billion a
year- in the flye years to 1985? That was around 14
percent of the gross value of exports of the six com-
modities included in the study — wheat, coarse
grains, sugar, beef, sheep, meat and dairy pr-oducts —
in 1985. Nocomparable estimate hasbeen made ofthe
effects of United States farm policies on the income of
Australian farmners. The greater complexity of farm
policy in the United States than in the European
Economic Community, and the greater- frequency of
major policy changes are strong deterrents to at-
tempts to duplicate the European Community study
for the United States. However, two major projects are
in progress in the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics of the international conse-
quences of United States farm policies. One project
focuses on grains and the other is more general in
scope.
‘Economic Research Service (1986).
‘Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985).
The World Bank has published estimates of the
effects on won’ld pr-ices and world trade volume of
removing policies in major’ countries and blocs that
cause pt-ices of agricultural commodities to differ from
world prices. ‘I’hese estimates provide a general indi-
cation of the wa a small trading country such as
Australia would be affected by liberalization of com-
modity markets in large countries. Some of these esti-
mates are shown in table 9?Note that liberalization in
a country or bloc means that policy-caused price
distortions are removed simultaneously for all seven
commodities, so that the results reflect interactions
between the commodities as liberalization changes
relative prices to producers and/or consumers.
Exceptfor wheat and coarse grains, liberalization in
the United States is estimated to have amuch stnaller
effect on world prices, and hence on other exporter-s
such as Australia, than liberalization in the European
Economic Community. A movement to free comnmod-
ity mar-kets in the United States is found to reduce the
world price for coarse grains, to the detriment ofother
exporters. This appear-s to be due to the removal of
acreage restrictions and to substitution of coarse
grains for-wheat upon liberalization.
World trade volume for coarse grains, pork and
poultry, and dairy products are found to increase
more with removal of protection in the United States
than in the European Community. Prices and trade
volume for-beef and lamb are increased much more by
market oriented policies in Japan than by liberaliza-
tion in the United States or theEuropean Community.
THREE APPROACHES TO MORE
OPEN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
MARKETS
Solutions to the problems of distorted and re-
stricted agricultural trade can be sought through uni-
lateral, bilateral and multilateral actions.
The balance between domestic benefits and costs
can be expected to determine action under each of
these approaches. The most plausible explanations of
government intervention in agriculture emphasize ec-
onomic characteristics (such as price elasticity of de-
mand and number ofproducers) which determine an
industry’s effectiveness in seeking assistance, and the
8The World Bank pointed out that the figures in table 9 almost
certainly underestimated the benefits to developed countries from
tradeliberalization.
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costs of providing assistance.’ A consequence of this
view, in contrast to the alter-native “public inter’est’
explanation for trade in interventions, is that govern-
ments are unlikely to change their’pn’ograms quickly in
response to new studies revealing that interventions
are costly to the overall community. Nevertheless,
resear’ch and education can educate the elector-ate
about the costs and benefits ofagricultural progr-ams.”
Unilateral Changes in U.S.Farm Policy
Many suggestions have been made for n-efon-ming
United States far-rn policy. An interesting comparison
of the effects of the Food Security Act 1985 and of six
‘Forexample, Gardner (1987);von Witzke (1986): Sieper (1982).
“Onedevelopment is a largestudyof theeconomic effectsof agricul-
tural policies in several countries that is being coordinated by the
Australian consultants Andy Stoeckel and Sandy Cuthbertson and
funded by the Australian and UnitedStates governments and Aus-
tralian farmers.
other farm policy proposals, as pr’epar’edby Resources
for the Future, is reproduced in table 10; it m-anks the
various policies in decreasing or’der’ of desirability to
each of three gr’oups; farmers, agribusiness and
households.” Actual values for’ net far’m income, acres
planted (the cr-iter-ion for ranking the policies from the
perspective ofagrihusinessi andfood and tax costs per
household at-c also shown for most policies.
Not surprisingly, the policies r’ated as best for pro-
ducers )mnandator-vsupply controls with export subsi-
dies, and two price schenies) rank near-the bottom for’
agr’ihusiness and for households. On this appr-oach,
the intet-ests of agribusiness are more closely aligned
to those of cOnsumer’s )taxpa~’ers)than they- are with
producer’s. This increases the prospects for reform of
United States fat-m policies in was favorable tohouse-
holds. Mat-ket-om-iented policies involving complete or
“Resources forthe Future(1987).
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partial decoupling of producer’ assistance from cur’-
rent production rank highest from theview of house-
have added a ranking of the policies from the
perspective of other exporting countries, such as Aus-
tralia. Unilateral use of mandatory supply controls,
with idling of 127 million acres (more than 40 per-cent
of the total cropland base) in 1991, is the policy that
Australian farmers would endorse most enthusiasti-
cally. However-, mandatory supply controls rank very
poorly for’ all U.S. interest gr-oups. Of some comton-t to
other exporting nations, perhaps, is that the worst U.S.
policies fr-om their- perspective )two price schemes,
decoupling with tm-ansitional income support, and
supply controls with export subsidies) would he un-
popular also with at least one of the domestic U.S.
gi’oupsY’
Bilateral Liberalization
Agreements reached between two countrnes to
reduce trade barriers may be consistent with the Gen-
eralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATU objective
of increasing world trade. This depends on whether
‘IftheUnited States weremoreconcerned about the foreignrelations
fallout from its farm policies on countries importing agricultural
commodities,the relevant rankingwould bethe reverse ofthat in the
final column of table 10. That would increase the attractiveness of
two priceschemes, decouplingwith temporary incomesupports and
supply controls with exportsubsidies.
holds.
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the extra trade that results between the two countries
is mainly a net addition to wor-ld trade or is obtained
largely by reducing other- countries’ tr’ade. Although
free trade areas between two or more countries are
permitted under Atticle 24 of GA’fl’, bilateral trade
liberalization appears inconsistent with the GAIT
most favored nation principle of extending to all GAiT
members reductions in trade impediments negotiated
with aparticular member country.
The Multilateral Approach
GAiT is the only forum for the detailed negotia-
tions required in an international approach to reduc-
ing impediments to freer trade. The fact that so little
was achieved toward freerworld agricultural trade in
the previous seven GAiT rounds is not a good omen
for the round that commmenced in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986. Increased pressure from
other international groups, notably the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the Economic Summit Countries, will be impor-
tant for pr-ogress towards a more liberal agricultural
trade regime in the current GAIT round.
The United States tabled its Ur’uguay round pro-
posalfor agriculture with GAiT in Geneva in July 1987.
Australia’s proposal is contained in the joint submis-
sion from the Cairns Group members, tabled in Octo-
ber 1987. While there are significant differences be-
tween the two proposals, these aie much less
important than the remarkable degree of comnmon
ground.
The United States and Australian (Cair-ns Group)
proposals both called for:
• the phasing out by the year 2000 of all policy rnea-
sures that directly or indirectly subsidize agricultural
production and all measures that limit market access:
• the usewhere governmentsprovide income support
for farmers ofmeasures that make payments indepen-
dent of current levels ofproduction and marketing:
• the reform of GAiT rules and disciplines consist-
ently with the above.
Agreement on these steps in the Uruguay round, and
their implementation, would ensure anew, liberal era
in world agricultur’al trade.
In deciding whether to participate actively in GAiT
efforts to reduce agricultural assistance multilaterally,
each nation will likely compare the economic effects
of multilateral liberalization on domestic groups with
the economic effects of reducing assistance irrdepen-
dent/v of other’ countries. The differences arise frDm
the lar-get- increase in won-Id pr-ices when protection is
removed from a bigger share of wor’ld production
under multilaten-al liberalization.
Anderson and Tvers (1987) have estimated the ef-
fects of gradually removing agricultural assistance by
individual countries or’ groups of countries, and by
many countries siniultaneously, over the period 1988
to 1995 that throws light on this. Some of their results
are shown in table 11. U.S. producers would lose
approximately $22 billion in 1995 if the U.S. removes
agricultural protection unilaterally. This lan-ge pro-
ducer loss becomes again of $3 billion if liberalization
occurs in all advanced market economies. In the Euro-
pean Economic Community, unilater-al liberalization
would cost producers an estimated $89 billion: this
would be r-educed to only $74 billion if liberalization
occurred in all industrial market economies.
It., as seems likely, government decisions on reduc-
ing agricultural assistance depend mainly on the way
pr-oducers are affected, the multilaten-al approach ap-
pear’s much more attractive for the United States than
going it alone. It is much less clear’ that either ap-
proach to liberalization would appeal to theEuropean
Economic Community. ‘I’his poses asubstantial prob-
lem for negotiations in the GAiT round.
Producers in Japan lose heavily from multilateral
liberalization, as they do from unilateral removal of
protection. Japan, also, can be expected to oppose
both routes to freer mar’kets ifproducer- inter-ests pre-
dominate.
In Australia and NewZealand, by contrast, farmers
would experience significant net gains in income un-
der the “let’s all do it together” route. The losses (not
shown in the table) from r-emoval of their- own gener-
allymodest) assistance would be easilyoutweighed by
the increases inworldprices resulting fromn removal of
much larger price distortions by the big players. Pr’o-
ducers in Australia and NewZealand can be expected
to be more enthusiastic about multilater-al liberaliza-
tion than farmer-s in the United States.
Taking economic gains to consumers taxpayers) as
the difference between neteconomic welfare and pi’o-
ducer gains in table 11, the results suggest that other
groups in the European Economic Community and,
more so, in the United States would prefer unilateral
to multilateral reform. This, also, may not augur- well
for progress in the GAiT round.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Australian farmer-s and Australia as a nation are
harmed by United States farm policies, though less
than they are by the agricultural policies of the Eur’o-
pean Economic Community. These effects are expet-i-
enced through power world commodity pr-ices and
trade volumes and incr-eased instability ofpnices. Mea-
sums ofthe international effects ofagricultural protec-
tionism in major’countries and blocs often under-state
the true effects. One reason for this is that protection-
ist measures often reduce domestic price uncertainty,
as well as raising producer’ prices. The effects of re-
duced uncertainty on investment and output can he
substantial, but frequently they are not captured in
measures of the impacts of policies.
Implementation in the United States of Administra-
tion proposals to reduce the assistance provided to
farmers viasubsidies and price supports, and reor’ien-
tation of assistance to supporting incomes indepen-
dently ofproduction, would be welcomed in Australia.
Similarly, the thrust of the United States proposal to
GAIT for multilateral phasing out of agricultural sub-
sidies and barriens to imports between 1990 and 2000
has been called ‘bold and imaginative” by Australia’s
prime minister.
However, both in multilateral negotiations and in
domestic policymaking, the powerhil forces that have
caused existing policies to he introduced and main-
tamed will not easily be overcome. United States
farmers will oppose more market-oriented policies if
they lower their incomes. They will prefer multilateral
reductions in agricultur-al protection, which will push
world prices up more, to unilateral reductions
confined to the United States. Moreover, they stand to
gain relatively much less from multilateral reductions
than do Australian farmers. With the relatively small
gain to U.S. farmers and the large losses for’ European
Community and Japanese farmers from phasing out
agricultural protection, it is easy to be somewhat pes-
simistic about the outcome of agricultural negotia-
lions in the current GAil’ round.
lfproduction-oriented support programs that have
produced the global agricultural crises are to be re-
placed by market-oriented policies supplemented by
production-independent income supports, con-
sumers and taxpayers must be convinced that it is
worthwhile to adopt niore cost-effective approaches
to bolstering farmers’ incomes.
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